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We investigate the link between employee treatment, labor investment efficiency and firm performance. 
Using a sample of 20,583 US firm-year observations, based on 2,680 firms from 1995 to 2015, we show 
that firms with better employee treatment have higher labor investment efficiency, productivity and 
profitability. Our results are primarily driven by employee treatment concerns, rather than strengths, and 
we also show that labor investment efficiency is positively associated with firm productivity and profitability. 
We find that other elements of corporate social responsibility, beyond employee treatment, are not 
associated with labor investment efficiency and are not reliably associated with performance. This placebo 
test supports our findings and is inconsistent with CSR in general being impacted by reverse causality or 
omitted correlated variables. Our results are economically as well as statistically significant. We estimate 
that firms with non-typical employee treatment experience a 10 percent impact on net employment change 
and half a percent impact on return on assets. 
 
Keywords: Employee Treatment; Labor Investment Efficiency; Firm Performance. 
 
  
                                                 
* Zhangfan Cao, e-mail address: s1478047@sms.ed.ac.uk; William Rees, e-mail address: bill.rees@me.com; The 
authors are from Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, University of Edinburgh, EH8 9JS, UK. 
 2 
 
Employee Treatment, Labor Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance 
1. Introduction 
A firm’s employees can be seen as either their most important asset or cost. The commitment, efficiency 
and creativity of the workforce may determine the firm’s growth opportunities but also its operating profit 
margins. Within our sample, we estimate total staff costs as averaging 34 percent of revenues. This varies 
widely and for those firms that are labor intensive it is obvious that employment costs are crucial to their 
profitability, but it could also be argued that for firms with high productivity the impact of the relatively 
small labor force would be geared up. In this context, human capital intensity becomes ambiguous. Human 
capital matters because it impacts on operating margins, or because a few employees determine the growth 
potential of the firm. This is underlined by the annual corporate spend on the workforce which we estimate 
as twelve times the investment in capital assets. It is interesting that studies of investment efficiency have 
traditionally seen investment as capital expenditure. Whilst labor costs are recurring, rather than sporadic, 
for most firms the investment in labor dwarfs that in conventional assets.  
This paper investigates the impact of employee treatment policies on firms’ labor investment 
efficiency. We also address the economic implication of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on 
firms’ value creation by investigating the impact of employee treatment and labor investment efficiency on 
labor productivity and profitability. In light of previous literature suggesting that employee-friendly policies 
can positively influence value creation, we argue that firms treating their employees well enjoy higher labor 
productivity and profitability and abnormal hiring also damages a firms’ productivity and profitability. 
Prior studies suggest that labor-friendly corporate practices are positively associated with better 
firm performance (Edmans, 2011, 2012; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011) and evidence how 
employee treatment can influence innovation, financial policies and capital structure decisions (Bae et al. 
2011; Chemmanur et al., 2013; Chen et al. 2016; Ghaly et al., 2015; Serfling, 2016). As yet, however, little is 
known about the impact of employee treatment on firms’ employment decisions, in particular those on 
labor investment efficiency, and consequently on productivity. In particular, finance research has long 
shown that agency conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and outsiders lead firms to 
undertake suboptimal levels of investment. A number of recent studies have explored the factors that can 
mitigate such market imperfections and improve investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et 
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al.2009; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lambert et al. 2007). We develop this line of research by extending capital 
investment efficiency to investment efficiency in labor, a crucial factor of production that has been largely 
overlooked by previous literature. 
We propose that better employee treatment lowers information asymmetry and employee adverse 
behavior, which helps firms to maintain net hiring that is closer to a level justified by their underlying 
economics and thus reduce labor adjustment costs. An examination of the relationship between employee 
treatment and labor investment efficiency is particularly interesting in this context for two reasons. Firstly, 
in competitive labor markets effective management of human capital is crucial to success. Recent studies 
have increasingly paid attention to the influence of employee treatment on firms’ capital structure decisions 
and financial policies (Bae et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016; Ghaly et al., 2015; Serfling, 
2016). Secondly, Benlemlih and Bitar (2015) provide evidence that owing to low information asymmetry 
and high stakeholder solidarity a firm’s social performance can positively contribute to its investment 
efficiency. The classical view considers labor as a variable factor that does not involve any adjustment costs 
and therefore the financing imperfections caused by information asymmetry are irrelevant for employment 
decisions. However, labor frictions exist and the associated costs can be substantial (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2002; Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Yashiv, 2007).  
In order to examine the relation between employee treatment and labor investment efficiency, we 
follow previous studies (Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007; Jung et al. 2014) and use firms’ net hiring (percentage 
change in the number of employees) to proxy for investment in labor. For our initial analyses, the expected 
level of net hiring is based on the model of Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), which includes economic variables 
that explain normal hiring practices such as sales growth, liquidity, leverage, and profitability. This measure 
of abnormal net hiring captures the amount of net hiring not attributable to underlying economic factors. 
Our employee treatment measure is obtained from MSCI ESG Research, formerly known as KLD. The 
KLD database has been extensively employed in previous studies of employee welfare (Bae et al., 2011; 
Cronqvist et al., 2009; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 
2010). Our measure uses KLD’s ‘Employee Relations’ metrics and we sum identified strengths less concerns 
in a given year (Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). Following Ertugrul (2013) and 
Ghaly et al. (2015), we also include the ‘Work/Life Benefits’ variable from the ‘Diversity’ dimension.  
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Our results are consistent with employee treatment improving investment efficiency in labor and 
appear to be driven more strongly by concerns than by strengths. This result is robust to various sensitivity 
tests and controls. As well as being statistically significant our results are consistent with 10 percent of the 
variation in abnormal investment in employment being driven by employee treatment practices. We also 
find that employee treatment directly impacts on labor productivity and profitability, as does abnormal 
investment in employment. Again, this would appear to be economically, as well as statistically, significant. 
Our results suggest that a firm which has net concerns or strengths of one could expect a variation in return 
on assets of half a percentage point, and abnormal investment in labor further impacts on return on assets. 
As our data suggests that approximately a third of firms’ costs are employment related, it is no surprise then 
that the treatment of employees is strongly associated with performance. 
As with most studies of CSR it is difficult to prove causality in the absence of an exogenous shock. 
It could be argued that good economic performance provides the resources for management to treat their 
employees well, rather than employee treatment generating good performance. It could also be that an 
omitted variable, for example management competence or strategic position, influences both employee 
treatment and performance. We have minimized the impact of these concerns by using a variety of 
estimation methods, not least using firm fixed effects to mitigate the impact of firm-specific omitted 
variables. However, we gain most confidence from our placebo test. If performance, management 
competence and/or strategic advantage provide the basis for good employee treatment, why would they 
not similarly lead to high standards in other dimensions of corporate social responsibility? Our tests suggest 
that they do not, leaving employee treatment as the best indicator of abnormal investment in labor, 
productivity and profitability. 
We contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, this study focuses on employee treatment and 
emphasizes investment efficiency in labor rather than capital. Hence, we contribute to relevant literature by 
extending capital investment efficiency to labor investment efficiency. Secondly, Servaes and Tamayo (2013) 
argue that the employee element of CSR can be a fruitful area for empirical research. Our study specifically 
investigates one part of CSR, employee treatment, and its impact on labor investment efficiency and 
productivity and profitability and further abnormal net hiring negatively affects employee productivity. 
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Hence our study extends the recent literature by addressing the economic implication of employee 
treatment and labor investment efficiency for firms’ value creation.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
2.1 Market frictions and capital investment efficiency 
In the frictionless capital market of Modigliani and Miller (1958) firms invest until the marginal benefit of 
capital investment equals the marginal costs, investing in all projects with positive net present value and 
none with negative net present value. In practice, however, firms face capital market imperfections 
stemming from information asymmetry and may either over- or under- invest (Stein, 2003).  
Previous literature has identified moral hazard and adverse selection as the two primary 
imperfections in the market that make firms depart from the optimal investment level. Moral hazard may 
lead to managers pursuing self-serving objectives to maximize their own personal welfare and invest in 
projects that are not in line with shareholder maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This can contribute 
to either over- or underinvestment depending on the availability of capital. Overinvestments are more likely 
to occur if firms have resources to invest. In that case, managers have incentives to consume resources and 
engage in empire building (Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006). Conversely, underinvestment occurs when 
capital is rationed, or managers shirk so that projects with positive net present value are neglected (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2003; Lambert et al., 2007). Adverse selection stems from information asymmetry 
between managers and suppliers of capital, which may also affect the efficiency of capital investment. If 
managers are better informed about the value of firms’ securities than investors, they are more likely to 
time capital issuance in order to issue overpriced securities (Baker et al, 2003). However, investors may 
respond to their information disadvantage by discounting newly issued securities and charging a higher cost 
of capital. If managers are reluctant to raise funds at a discounted price, projects with positive NPV will be 
missed and underinvestment occurs (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Traditionally this analysis is considered 
relevant to capital investment and capital transfers. We believe it can be extended to investment in 
employees. 
2.2 Employee treatment and labor investment efficiency 
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Recent studies have paid attention to firm employee treatment schemes and their relevance to firm 
performance. They find that better employee treatment schemes are usually associated with better 
performance (Edmans, 2011, 2012; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011). For example, Edmans (2011) 
contends that firms with satisfied employees exhibit more positive earnings surprises, announcement 
returns, and long-term stock returns and Chen et al. (2016) find that firms treating their employees well 
produce more and better patents. This suggests that better employee treatment schemes are in line with 
benefits to shareholders. Other studies examine the impact of employee treatment on firms’ capital 
structure decisions and financial policies. Several papers test Titman’s (1984) predictions by studying the 
relationship between leverage and employee treatment. Chemmanur et al. (2013) find that leverage has a 
positive and significant influence on average employee pay, and that the incremental total labor expenses 
associated with an increase in leverage offset the incremental tax benefits of debt. This supports the 
theoretical prediction that labor costs constrain the use of debt. Similarly, Bae et al. (2011) report that firms 
treating their employees well maintain low debt ratios and suggest that firms’ incentives to treat their 
employees well is an important determinant of their financing policies. In addition, Serfling (2016) finds 
that firms adopting state-level labor protection laws that exogenously increase employee firing costs reduce 
their debt ratios. Prior studies also suggest that firms with better employee treatment schemes, and 
operating in industries with a higher share of skilled workers, tend to hold larger cash balances (Ghaly et al, 
2015; Ghaly et al, 2017). In general, corporate social responsibility, of which employee welfare and 
treatment is an integral part, has been found to reduce information asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al, 2011; Cho 
et al, 2013) and analyst forecast error (Dhaliwal et al, 2012), and to increase financial reporting quality (Kim 
et al, 2012) and investment efficiency (Benlemlih and Bitar, 2015). 
These studies focus on employee treatment’s impact on capital structure, financial policy and 
investment decisions. However, Jung et al. (2014) focuses on the impact on employees by investigating the 
impact of financial reporting quality on labor investment efficiency and find that high-quality financial 
reporting improves investment efficiency in labor. Our study focuses on the impact of employee treatment 
on investment in employees, concentrating on abnormal hiring. We argue that the relation between 
employee treatment and firms’ net hiring stems from two potential sources, information asymmetry and 
employee governance. 
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Information asymmetry and labor investment efficiency. 
One possible explanation for the connection between employee treatment and firms’ net hiring can stem 
from information asymmetry. The classical view considers labor as a variable factor that does not involve 
significant adjustment and financing costs. However, labor economists find that labor frictions arise from 
search and matching (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), direct wage costs (Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2002) and hiring and firing costs (Yashiv, 2007). Further, recruiting, training, firing and 
disruption costs suggest that adjusting labor stock for firms is a long way from costless and such costs can 
be substantial (Farmer, 1985; Hamermesh, 1993). As firms become more human-capital-intensive, 
management of human resources is likely to become increasingly important (Turban and Greening, 1997; 
Zingales, 2000).  
Stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987) suggests that financial stakeholders are more likely 
to increase costly explicit claims if they doubt a firm’s ability to honor its implicit claims to non-financial 
stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). Zingales (2000, p. 1634) argues: 
“Once we recognize the existence of implicit contracts, then there are other residual claimants besides equity holders who may 
need to be protected. It then becomes unclear whether control should reside in the hands of shareholders, because the pursuit of 
shareholder’s value maximization may lead to inefficient action, such as the breach of value implicit contracts” From a human 
resource perspective, a firm’s failure to achieve good employee relations can lead to low employee morale 
and high employee turnover, which can ultimately erode their reputation in the labor market. Stuebs and 
Sun (2010) find that corporate reputation is associated with improved labor efficiency and productivity and 
therefore has important implications for corporate social activities and initiatives. Conversely, poor 
employee relations is expected to make non-financial stakeholders doubt the firm’s ability to honor their 
implicit claims and lead to a reduction in the value of implicit claims to new stakeholders, resulting in a 
reduction in future cash flows and the value of the firm (Bowen et al, 1995; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). 
Prior studies find that firms having harmonious relations with their stakeholders enjoy higher value of 
implicit claims to its stakeholders and its future cash flows and firm value are less likely to be adversely 
affected by unsatisfied non-financial stakeholders, thus leading to lower financing costs (Cheng et al. 2014; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; El Ghoul et al, 2011). In this respect, employee-friendly treatment conveys additional 
information to the market about a firm’s ability to honor implicit claims, which ultimately helps to reduce 
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adverse selection problems and lower the information asymmetry between corporate managers and market 
participants that creates market friction. 
The human capital theory of corporate governance emphasizes the importance of shifting from 
the classical agency problem between manager and shareholder to examine human capital treatment for 
corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2000; Zingales, 2000). For instance, Guo et al. (2015) find 
that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of ineffective internal control and firms with 
employee-friendly policies enjoy significantly lower propensity for employee-related material weaknesses. 
By aligning the interest between firms and their employees, firms with employee-friendly treatment mitigate 
moral hazard problems by enabling more effective internal monitoring, thus contributing to lower 
information asymmetry. 
Employee governance, labor investment efficiency and productivity. 
A second potential mechanism by which employee treatment can affect net hiring stems from employee 
governance. Previous literature shows that employment contracts are generally incomplete because it is too 
costly to specify all aspect of labor performance (Demski and Feltham, 1978; Klein, 1980). Divergence also 
exists among different groups in society regarding employee monitoring since each group has its own 
rationale for or against employee monitoring whether it be economic, legal or ethical (Martin and Freeman, 
2003). Consequently, firms face various adverse behavior situations where the interests of employees and 
the firm are misaligned, and employees’ motivation and effort are imperfectly observed (Flammer and Luo, 
2017).  
Examples of adverse employee behavior include counterproductive and disengaged behavior, such 
as shirking responsibilities, on-the-job searches for better jobs and using company resources for personal 
business. Flammer and Luo (2017) suggest that if employees perceive their current job to be superior to 
their alternatives, they are less likely to engage in adverse behavior. One way to lower the attractiveness of 
alternative options and mitigate adverse behavior is to align employees and their firms’ interests. Akerlof 
(1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986, 1990) suggest that the reciprocity in the gift exchange model makes 
employees invest more effort in work because they treat the benefits from their firms as a gift and are 
assumed to respond to the benefits by making greater effort. Moreover, employee-friendly treatment aligns 
the interests between employees and their firms, which makes employees more likely to perceive their 
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current employment special and hence mitigates employee adverse behavior (Organ, 1997; Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).  
Hnece, in addition to financial employee treatment, Flammer and Luo (2017) find that relationship-
based incentives such as CSR can be used as employee governance tools. These encourage nurturing and 
constraining mechanisms that facilitate alignment of interests between employees and their firms, lower the 
attractiveness of alternative options and diminish information asymmetry. We argue that employee-friendly 
treatment mitigates employees’ adverse behavior. Firms with employee-friendly treatment may therefore 
suffer less unexpected employment changes and perform better. 
We firstly hypothesize that employee-friendly treatment schemes enable firms to maintain 
employment levels close to that justified by their underlying economics. Consequently, we expect a firm’s 
employee treatment to be negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency: 
Hypothesis 1: Employee treatment is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency. 
We also examine the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on firm productivity. 
Prior studies show that CSR, including employee-friendly practices, can facilitate higher labor productivity 
(Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Sun and Stuebs, 2013; Sanchez and Benito-Hernandez, 2015; Hasan et al, 2016). 
For instance, Sanchez and Benito-Hernandez (2015) find that firms’ social involvements in internal aspects 
of the company contribute to a short-term increase in labor productivity. Faleye and Trahan (2011) also 
argue that top executives derive no pecuniary benefits from labor-friendly practices but suggest that genuine 
concern for employees facilitates higher productivity and profitability. We propose that one of the channels 
via which employee treatment and labor investment efficiency can affect value creation is via labor 
productivity and therefore examine the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on labor 
productivity. Given that previous literature suggests that employee-friendly policies can positively influence 
value creation, we argue that firms treating their employees well may enjoy higher labor productivity. 
Further, abnormal net hiring suggests a deviation from the employment level justified by underlying 
economics and signals inefficient labor investment and we predict that abnormal net hiring has negative 
impact on a firm’s employee productivity. Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a positive relation 
between employee treatment and labor productivity and a negative relation between abnormal net hiring 
and labor productivity: 
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Hypothesis 2: Employee treatment is positively associated with employee productivity whereas labor investment inefficiency is 
negatively associated with employee productivity. 
 
3. Research design 
We estimate the impact of employee treatment on the absolute value of abnormal net hiring and the impact 
of both employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on various measures of productivity. Our primary 
analysis is based on a panel data-set with fixed effects for firm and year. Prior research has typically used 
industry and year fixed effects to test the the association between test and outcome variables. For our 
sample this produces somewhat higher coefficients and statistical significance than a firm fixed effects 
model. However, it is unclear whether the direction of causality is as hypothesized or whether correlated 
omitted variables are influencing the results. The problem can be easily seen from our sample descriptive 
statistics. From the turn of the century our sample size increases, abnormal investment also increases and 
the employee treatment metric declines. In the absence of firm fixed effects this would tend to produce a 
negative correlation between employee treatment and abnormal investment. This would be reduced, but is 
unlikely to be eliminated, by control variables such as size. By using firm fixed effects we further mitigate, 
but may not eliminate, these problems.  
Our sensitivity tests include alternative measures of both the independent and test variables and 
provide broad support for our results. We also re-estimate our main models using an instrumental variable 
approach, which provides some reassurance that the main results are reliable. However, we gain most 
confidence in our results from a placebo test. We re-estimate the main test equations using dimensions of 
CSR other than employee treatment. Our contention is that if reverse causality, or omitted correlated 
variables, caused the statistically significant association between CSR and abnormal net hiring or 
productivity, this could also be expected to show up as an association between the other CSR dimensions 
and the dependent variables. In general, we do not find this to be the case. 
3.1 Sample  
Our sample selection process is detailed in Table 1. The sample selection begins with all COMPUSTAT 
firm-years between 1991-2016 with non-negative sales and assets and non-missing historical SIC codes. We 
merge our data with CRSP to obtain total annual stock return and also exclude observations from financial 
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services (primary two-digit SIC codes between 60-69). We further delete 24,257 firm-years with insufficient 
data to estimate abnormal net hiring. This leaves us with 96,221 observations to estimate Model 1. After 
merging with the KLD database, and restricting the sample to 1995-2016, our sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of 20,583 firm-year observations from 2,680 US firms. In order to test the impact of 
employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on employee productivity, and according to which dependent 
variable is under test, we exclude between 6,902 and 9,434 firm-years with insufficient data to compute 
Model 3, resulting in a test sample of 11,149 to 13,681 firm-years. 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
3.2 Measure of labor investment efficiency 
To measure labor investment, we use firms’ net hiring, measured as the percentage change in the number 
of employees (Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007; Li, 2011). We estimate investment inefficiency as abnormal net 
hiring, defined as the difference between the actual change in a firm’s labor force and the expected change 
based on economic fundamentals. Thus, following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung et al. (2014), the 
absolute value of abnormal net hiring is the proxy for labor investment inefficiency. Abnormal net hiring 
is the absolute value of the error term from the following equation (Model 1). 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁3𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁4𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁5𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Following prior research NET HIRE is the percentage change in employees; SALES_G is the percentage 
change in sale revenue; ROA is net income scaled by beginning of the year total assets; RETURN is the 
annual stock return; SIZE P is the percentile of the log of market value of equity at the beginning of the 
year; LIQ is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities; LEV is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year; LOSSBIN is an indicator variables for 
each 0.005 interval of prior year ROA from 0 to -0.025, where in all cases i indicates the firm and t the year. 
As in Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung et al. (2014), we find NET HIREit is positively associated 
with sale growth (SALES_Git, SALES_Git-1), profitability (∆ROAit-1, ROAit), stock return (RETURNit), 
firm size (SIZEit−1), and liquidity (LIQit−1, ∆LIQit−1). I t is negatively associated with current year changes 
 12 
in profitability (∆ROAit) and small reported losses (LOSSBINit−1) variables; liquidity (∆LIQit) and leverage 
(LEVit−1). We report the descriptive statistics and results for Equation 1 in the Appendix. 
3.3 Measure of employee treatment 
In order to assess a firm’s employee treatment, we use data from KLD. KLD, now MSCI ESG Research, 
has expanded its coverage and included CSR strengths and weaknesses for a large subset of its constituent 
firms. The database covers firms that comprise the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 and the Domini 400 
Social Index up to 2000. In 2001, it further extended its coverage to firms in the Russell 1,000 Index. It 
includes approximately 650 firms for the period from 1991 to 2000, 1,100 firms for 2001 to 2002, and 3,000 
or more firms for the period from 2003 to 2015. The database has been widely used in previous research 
(Deng et al, 2013; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Flammer, 2015; Khan et al, 2016; Lins et al, 2017). The KLD 
database estimates a firm’s CSR performance using many sources, including company filings, government 
data, nongovernmental organization data, and more than 14,000 global media sources. It contains seven 
dimensions of CSR: community, employee relations, diversity, environment, human rights, product quality 
and corporate governance. It also excludes classifications firms in the ‘sin’ industries: alcohol, firearms, 
gambling, tobacco, nuclear power, and military contracting.  
Following previous studies in employee treatment and welfare (Bae et al., 2011; Cronqvist et al., 
2009; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010) we 
construct our employee treatment scores using KLD’s rating on ‘Employee Relations’, with a higher net score 
demonstrating better employee treatment performance. Our primary measure of employee treatment, 
EMP_TREAT, is estimated by adding identified strengths and subtracting identified concerns included in 
‘Employee Relations’ dimensions in each year (Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). The 
employee treatment variable contains labor-relevant components including union relations, cash profit 
sharing, employee involvement and retirement benefits. Following Ertugrul (2013) and Ghaly et al. (2015), 
we also include the ‘Work/Life Benefits’ variable from the ‘Diversity’ dimension. 
3.4 Empirical models 
Our primary analyses on the relation between employee treatment and labor investment efficiency are based 
on the following model (Model 2): 
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 𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑆𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐷_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽14𝐴𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Following prior research (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2014) AB NETHIRE is 
the absolute value of the difference between actual net hiring and the expected level measured as in Pinnuck 
and Lillis (2007); EMP_TREAT is the employee treatment score constructed from KLD database; MTB is 
the ratio of market to book value of common equity at the beginning of the year; SIZE is the log of market 
value of equity at the beginning of the year; LIQ is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus 
receivables to current liabilities; LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the 
year; DIVD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
TANGIBLES is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
LABINT is the ratio of employees to total assets at the beginning of the year; SD CFO is the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operation over year t-5 to t-1; SD SALES is the standard deviation of sales 
revenue over year t-5 to t-1; SD NETHIRE is the standard deviation of percentage change in employees 
over year t-5 to t-1; UNION is the industry-level rate of labor unionization for year t-1; AB INVEST is the 
absolute value of the residual from the following model (Biddle et al. 2009) INVESTit = β0 + 
β1SALEsGROW T Hit−1 + εit; and i identifies the firm and t the year. 
Our analyses on the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on employee 
productivity are based on the following model (Model 3): 
𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸_𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here EMP PRODCit is one of four indicators of performance: SALES is employee productivity, measured 
as the natural logarithm of sales divided by the number of employee; GPROFIT is employee productivity, 
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measured as the natural logarithm of sales minus cost of goods sold divided by the number of employee; 
NETINCOME is employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of net income divided by the 
number of employee; ROA is return on assets. Two additional control variables, not used in model 2, are 
introduced following prior research; GOVERN is the corporate governance scores from KLD database; 
and CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In order to obtain our primary measure of abnormal net hiring, we first estimate model 1. The descriptive 
statistics and preliminary results are reported in Appendix 2. Following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), we 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective distribution to reduce 
the influence of outliers. Our descriptive statistics for the percentage change in the number of employees 
and other control variables are comparable to those reported in Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung et al. 
(2014), and our results and the sign of each variable are consistent with the results of prior studies. Our 
model has an adjusted R2 of approximately 21.4 percent in comparison with 24.5 percent in Pinnuck and 
Lillis (2007) and 27.2 percent in Jung et al. (2014). Overall, the specification of our model is generally 
consistent with prior studies, and the model provides reasonable estimates for the expected level of net 
hiring. The absolute value of the difference between actual net hiring and the expected level is our measure 
of abnormal net hiring. 
In panel A of Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in models 2 and 3. 
The dependent variable, AB NETHIRE, has a mean of 0.12 and a median of 0.08 with a standard deviation 
of 0.19. This is close to Jung et al. (2014) results with a mean of 0.11 and median of 0.07 with standard 
deviation of 0.13 for abnormal net hiring. We also divided the variable into two subsamples based on the 
sign of abnormal net hiring. Positive abnormal net hiring, OVER LABOR, indicates that a firm’s actual net 
hiring is greater than expected whilst UNDER LABOR, indicates that actual net hiring is less than expected. 
Consistent with Ghaly et al. (2015), our main variable of interest, EMP TREAT, ranges from -4 to 4 with 
a mean of -0.04 and median of 0, suggesting that the number of firms with negative employee treatment 
scores outweigh the number of firms with positive employee treatment scores. 17 percent of the sample 
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score -1, 65 percent 0 and 12 percent +1, so only 6 percent fall outside those classifications. The descriptive 
statistics of other control variables are generally consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) and Jung et al. (2014). 
For Equation 3, our descriptive statistics include employee productivity measures, SALES, GPROFIT and 
NETINCOME, all per employee, plus ROA and additional control variables including corporate 
governance (GOVERNit−1) and capital expenditure (CAPXit−1). In Panel B of Table 2, we report the 
frequency of firms in our sample by year plus the mean employee treatment and abnormal net hiring 
variables per year. We observe fluctuations by year caused by both changing circumstances and changing 
sample coverage.  
In panel C of Table 2, we contrast the descriptive statistics of firms with positive, zero, and negative 
employee treatments. The comparison indicates that firms with employee-friendly treatment policies have 
lower mean abnormal net hiring (10.6%) than those with negative employee treatment (12.8%). These 
differences are statistically significant for both the mean and median. The differences between the 
productivity and profitability variables are also all statistically significant, with firms with positive employee 
treatment outperforming those with negative. Mean per employee sales are 5.8 vs. 5.6, per employee gross 
profit 4.9 vs. 4.4, and per employee net income, 3.3, vs. 2.6 and return on assets 6.2%, vs. 3.9%. 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in Equations 2 and 3. We find a 
negative and significant correlation between the employee treatment score (EMP TREAT) and the level of 
abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE), indicating that firms with good employee treatment practices are 
generally associated with a higher level of labor investment efficiency. The correlations among other 
variables is generally consistent with our expectations. For instance, we find firms with higher growth 
options, higher levels of liquidity and higher concurrent abnormal non-labor investments are more likely to 
have higher abnormal net hiring. However, larger firms, firms paying dividends in the past and firms with 
a higher level of tangibility are negatively associated with abnormal net hiring. In addition, we generally find 
abnormal net hiring is negatively associated with labor productivity and profitability whereas employee 
treatment is positively associated with labor productivity and profitability. 
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
4.2 The impact of employee treatment on abnormal labor investment (model 2) 
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Table 4 shows the relationship between employee treatment score (EMP TREAT) and abnormal net hiring. 
Column one presents the results for the model using the absolute value of the residual, AB NETHIRE, 
and the estimated coefficient on EMP TREAT is negatively and statistically significant. We find that larger 
firms and firms with a higher level of tangibility exhibit more efficient labor investments, whilst those with 
higher level of liquidity, leverage and higher abnormal non-labor investments are more likely to suffer labor 
investment inefficiency.  
 In our sample 17% have an employee treatment score of -1 and 12% have +1. Few are more 
extreme. However, a departure of one from the median implies abnormal net hiring of approximately 0.6%, 
which, given the mean annual employment change of 6%, suggests that one in ten of the employment 
changes is impacted by the 29% of companies that score one concern or strength more than the median 
zero. This implies that employee treatment practices have an economically significant impact on 
employment outcomes.  
 In columns two and three of Table 4, we estimate our baseline model based on the subsamples 
of firms that exhibit overinvestment and underinvestment in labor. The results confirm that firms with 
better employee treatment performance tend to have less labor overinvestment but also less labor 
underinvestment. This validates our use, following prior research, of absolute abnormal investment as our 
main variable of interest. Where an outcome variable is transformed as fundamentally as we do in taking 
the absolute value, it is important to ensure that we are not obscuring basic differences in the effect of 
employee treatment on under and over labor investment. Our results suggest that the impact is stronger 
for overinvestment, but the difference is not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
4.3 Robustness tests of model 2. 
In column 4 of table 4, we use the Fama-MacBeth approach to estimate our baseline regression model and 
also, in column 5, restrict the sample to firms with positive or negative, but not neutral, employee treatment. 
The results are consistent with those reported in column 1.  
 Prior research has also tested the sensitivity of the estimation process to alternative definitions 
of labor investment efficiency. Firstly, following Cella (2009), we use a firm’s industry median level of net 
hiring as a proxy for the optimal level. Secondly, we follow Biddle et al. (2009) and estimate a firm-specific 
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model of labor investment as a function of sales growth and use the absolute value of the residuals as the 
proxy for deviations from expected investment in labor. Thirdly, we use the augmented version of Pinnuck 
and Lillis (2007) model and re-estimate model one with additional variables, including industry unionization 
rate, capital expenditure, research and development expenses, acquisition expenses, lagged value of 
observed labor investment and logarithm of GDP per capita. The correlations between these three 
alternatives and our original estimate of abnormal labor investment are high and the results from the models 
very similar. These results are available on request. 
 We also include various additional control variables that are not included in our baseline model 
because the data requirements lead to additional sample loss. We include governance proxies, corporate 
governance and institutional ownership respectively in our baseline regression because corporate 
governance and the influence of institutional investor may potentially affect investment policies and 
employee treatment. Moreover, Jung et al. (2014) find that high-quality financial reporting facilitates more 
efficient investments in labor and show that financial reporting quality is also one of the factors that have 
influential impact on labor investment efficiency. Therefore, we also use financial reporting quality as a 
control variable in our regression to test the robustness of our results. We use discretionary accrual as the 
proxy for financial reporting quality and estimate discretionary accrual by using the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model suggested in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) given the less restrictive data 
requirements of cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model. The model for estimating 
discretionary accrual includes lagged return on assets (ROAit−1) as a regressor to control for the effect of 
performance on measured discretionary accruals. We estimate the model for every industry classified by 
the two-digit SIC code for each year. Following previous studies, we use the absolute value of discretionary 
accrual as the proxy for financial reporting quality. The larger the value of the absolute value of discretionary 
accrual, the lower the level of financial reporting quality. The models including additional control variables 
yield results that are entirely consistent with those reported.  
4.4 Re-estimation of model 2 using instrumental variables. 
While using an extensive list of control variables that reduce the potential omitted variable bias in estimating 
the association between a firm’s employee treatment and labor investment efficiency, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the results generated from the baseline model suffer from endogeneity bias. In order to 
 18 
address this concern, we use an instrumental variable estimation. First, as an instrument for employee 
treatment of firm i in year t, we use the average employee treatment scores of firms with headquarters 
located in the same state. Prior research shows that physical proximity can be an important factor for 
corporate policies (Pirinsky and Wang, 2010; Jiraporn et al, 2014). Thus, as an integral part of a firm’s social 
performance, employee welfare and treatment practices are also likely to be affected by firms’ geographic 
proximity. In order to avoid the situation where the employee treatment performance of one given firm 
affects the average employee treatment score of the geographically proximate firms, we require each state 
to contain at least ten firms for each year. In the same vein, firms operating in the same industry also tend 
to exhibit similar employee treatment practices and we therefore use the mean of the employee treatment 
score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i ’s 2-digit SIC code as an instrument for employee treatment 
of firm i in year t (El Ghoul et al., 2011). 
 In the appendix, we report results for model 2 using instrumental variable estimation. The first 
column reports the first-stage equation, indicating a strong correlation between firm and both state and 
industry employee treatment levels. Column 3 present the results regarding the relation between employee 
treatment and labor investment efficiency from the second stage regression estimated using 2SLS. Similar 
results were generated using GMM, and LIML. The results confirm the negative and significant association 
between employee treatment and abnormal net hiring, which is consistent with the results generated from 
our baseline OLS regressions. In addition, the two instrumental variables pass both the Cragg and Donald 
(1993) instrument relevance test and the Sargan (1958) over-identification test. 
4.5 The impact of non-labor dimensions of CSR on abnormal net hiring. 
Bouslah et al. (2013) argue that the aggregate CSR measure may confound the influence of individual CSR 
dimensions and therefore each individual CSR dimension should be considered separately. However, our 
main reason for investigating the impact of dimensions of CSR other than employee treatment on abnormal 
net hiring is to help rule out reverse causality and omitted correlated variables as explanations for the 
statistically significant association we report in the previous section. If a firm characteristic, such as 
managerial competence or strategic advantage, impacted on abnormal hiring, or productivity, and also 
affected employee treatment, we might expect that characteristic to similarly effect other dimensions of 
CSR. If we find no effect it is conceivable, even if unlikely, that the omitted firm characteristic only impacts 
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on employee treatment. However, if we find an effect on other elements of CSR, where we have no clear 
hypothesis for an impact, it is strongly suggestive that the result for employee treatment may be driven by 
endogeneity. 
 To rule out this possibility, we test the impact of each dimension of CSR on abnormal net hiring, 
which potentially serves as a placebo test to indicate whether the relationship between employee treatment 
and abnormal net hiring associated with a firm’s social performance or only with employee treatment. Five 
social dimensions are very different from employee treatment: environment; community; diversity; product; 
and human rights. However, employee relations includes the employee treatment dimensions as well as 
employee cash profit sharing, employee involvement, employee health and safety, human capital 
development, labor management relations and supply chain issues. An overlap between the results for 
employee treatment and employee relations is to be expected. For the other dimensions if it is reverse 
causality or omitted variables that drive the relationship, we should observe significant results between 
abnormal net hiring and social dimensions other than employee dimensions. If it is employee treatment 
policies that drive more efficient labor investment, we should only observe significant results between 
employee dimensions and labor investment efficiency. 
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
 In Table 5, our results show that only employee-relations is significantly associated with abnormal 
net hiring. This is as expected given that employee relations include the employee treatment dimension. 
Further testing reveals that the additional elements in employee relations, not in employee treatment, are 
insignificant if used independently. These results are therefore consistent with the contention that it is 
relevant employee treatment elements of CSR that impact on abnormal net hiring and not CSR in general. 
They are also inconsistent with the contention that abnormal net hiring impacts on CSR, although that 
might be considered unlikely, or that abnormal net hiring and CSR are both caused by an omitted correlated 
variable such as management competence or competitive advantage. 
4.6 The impact of employee treatment strengths and concerns on abnormal net hiring. 
Mattingly and Berman (2006) highlight the importance of distinguishing between strengths and concerns 
in recent social responsibility research because they are empirically and conceptually distinct constructs and 
there could be compensating effects. Hence, we split the employee treatment measure into employee 
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treatment strengths (EMP STR) and employee treatment concerns (EMP CON), which allows us to observe 
how the components of the primary employee treatment (EMP TREAT) affect firms’ labor investment 
efficiency. Our first hypothesis is that employee treatment strengths would enhance firms’ labor investment 
efficiency and therefore are negatively associated with abnormal net hiring, whereas employee treatment 
concerns pose a misalignment between the interests of employees and a firm’s objective and are expected 
to lower a firm’s labor investment efficiency. We have no theoretical reasons to predict that either strengths 
or concerns would be the more powerful. 
Table 6 reports the impact of employee treatment strengths (EMP STR) and concerns (EMP CON) 
on overall abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE), labor overinvestment (OVER LABOR) and labor 
underinvestment (UNDER LABOR). In the first three columns in Table 6, we only find a negative and 
relatively weak association between EMP STR and abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE) and 
overinvestment in labor (OVER LABOR), which indicates that employee treatment strengths reduce labor 
investment inefficiency. We do not find significant results regarding overall employee treatment strengths 
in reducing labor underinvestment. On the other hand, we find employee treatment concerns, EMP CON, 
is positively associated with abnormal net hiring, suggesting that firms with more employee treatment 
concerns suffer more labor investment inefficiency. Moreover, we find the EMP CON variable is also 
negatively associated with underinvestment in labor (negative abnormal net hiring), which suggests that 
firms with more employee treatment concerns are more likely to have less actual net hiring than expected, 
thus leading to labor underinvestment. Overall, we find solid evidence that employee treatment concerns 
can distort normal labor hiring and lead to labor investment inefficiency and relatively weak evidence that 
employee treatment strengths effectively increase labor investment efficiency. 
[Insert Table 6 near here] 
4.7 The impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on labor productivity 
To demonstrate the economic implication of employee treatment (EMP TREAT) and abnormal net hiring 
(AB NETHIRE), we further investigate the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on 
three measures of labor productivity: sales, gross profit and net profit per employee (SALES, GPROFIT 
and NETINCOME) and on profitability (ROA). Previous studies have investigated the link between value 
creation and employee-friendly treatment (Zingales, 2000; Filbeck and Preece, 2003; Edmans, 2011). We 
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argue that labor productivity is one of the potential channels via which employee treatment and labor 
investment efficiency can affect value creation and therefore examine the impact of employee treatment 
and abnormal net hiring on labor productivity. Given previous literature suggesting that employee-friendly 
policies can positively influence value creation, we argue that firms treating their employees well enjoy 
higher labor productivity and profitability. Additionally, because abnormal net hiring deviates from firms’ 
employment levels justified by their underlying economics, we predict that abnormal net hiring damages 
labor productivity and profitability. 
The results in Table 7 confirm our predictions contained in hypothesis 2. Specifically, we find the 
estimated coefficients on employee treatment are positive and significant when gross profit per employee 
(GPROFIT), income per employee (NETINCOME) and return on assets (ROA) are the dependent 
variables, indicating that employee-friendly treatment positively enhances labor productivity and firms’ 
profitability. Sales per employee (SALES) is not significantly associated with employee treatment. We also 
find the lagged abnormal net hiring is negatively associated with labor productivity and profitability for all 
four dependent variables, which suggests that abnormal net hiring damages labor productivity and firms’ 
profitability. Overall, our tests for the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on labor 
productivity suggest that employee-friendly treatment policies enhance labor productivity whereas sub- 
optimal net hiring is costly in terms of labor productivity. 
[Insert Table 7 near here] 
4.8 Non-labor dimensions of CSR impacts on productivity and profitability. 
We further investigate the impact of each CSR dimension on labor productivity and profitability to observe 
whether there are specific CSR dimensions that contributes to labor productivity and profitability. In Table 
8, we report the results of the tests but for the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients on CSR related 
variables plus abnormal net hiring. In all 24 cases we find that abnormal net hiring is negatively related to 
performance. This is consistent with the results reported earlier and there is no reason to expect a change. 
We also find that employee relations is significantly and positively associated with both net income and 
return on assets. As this variable incorporates employee treatment, and these results are consistent with 
employee treatment, this is unsurprising. Employee relations is insignificantly associated with gross profit 
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and sales whereas employee treatment was significantly associated with gross profit. This is consistent with 
the generally weaker relationship between employee relations and outcomes than employee treatment. 
Excluding employee relations there are five dimensions of CSR and four outcomes. Our hypothesis 
is that employee treatment will be associated with performance but that other dimensions will, on balance, 
not be. If they were, it would raise the possibility of reverse causality or omitted correlated variables. Table 
8 shows that, apart from employee relations, the coefficient on the CSR dimensions are statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better, in eight instances. Environment is negatively associated with sales, 
community negatively related with return on assets, diversity positively related with sales and negatively 
with ROA, product development positively related with both gross profit and net income, and human rights 
negatively related with return on assets. Eight statistically significant results out of 20 is clearly more than 
we would expect by chance but only three are positive. On balance the relationship between CSR 
dimensions and productivity and profitability would appear to be negative. We test the collective statistical 
significance of all 20 coefficients and confirms no significant difference from zero. It is surprising that 
productivity and profitability appear to be more often significantly associated with CSR dimensions than 
expected by chance, but the test confirms no overall positive relationship. The positive relationship between 
employee treatment and performance stands out as different from the other dimensions of CSR.  
[Insert Table 8 near here] 
4.9 Alternative indicators of employee treatment: Fortune’s Best 100 List 
Our results suggest that employee-friendly treatment policies, as indicated by KLD, are consistent with 
lower levels of abnormal net hiring, higher productivity and higher profitability. The KLD measure is widely 
available and has considerable credibility from its widespread use in research. However, some previous 
studies have also used Fortune magazine’s list of the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ (Fortune List hereafter) 
as an alternative indicator of employee treatment (Bae et al., 2011; Edmans, 2011; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; 
Ghaly et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016). If effective, this would be a valuable alternative 
indicator which would provide a useful robustness test. However, the Fortune List is biased towards large 
and successful firms and so it is less effective than KLD as a general indicator of employee treatment for 
our sample. It also explicitly identifies firms that are good employers whereas KLD identifies both good 
and bad employee treatment, and our results suggest that concerns are more powerful indicators than 
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strengths. Given these reservations we argue that a standard firm fixed effect panel model is unlikely to be 
the best method of analysis and that a better contrast between the performance of the best firms to work 
for and others might be achieved using a propensity score matching approach. Nevertheless, to benchmark 
our results we have conducted fixed effects panel models using both approaches. In the first we classify all 
firms which are in the Fortune List anywhere in our sample period as being good firms to work for (Faleye 
and Trahan, 2011). This produces statistically significant results which are consistent with our results based 
on the KLD. However, this approach classifies large successful firms as good firms to work for, irrespective 
of their annual rank, and complicates controlling for firm fixed effects. For our analysis, we suspect that 
this approach will be subject to omitted correlated variables: most notably successful and wealthy firms can 
afford to treat their employees well, they will be productive and profitable and have the resources to ensure 
stable recruitment practices and hence low levels of abnormal investment in labor. Therefore, we use firm 
fixed effects and simply classify a firm as being a good firm to work for in the year in which it is listed as 
such and we find that the Fortune List variable is typically insignificant. This sensitivity of the results to 
method suggests that using the Fortune List in this way is potentially unreliable and propensity score 
matching should indeed be preferred.  
Thus, in our propensity score matching approach we use the appropriate regression models from 
models 2 and 3 to estimate the propensity of a firm being included in the Fortune List in any particular year 
and select the control firms as the nearest neighbor (without replacement) and alternatively the nearest 
three neighbors (with replacement). Both methods produce treatment and control samples which are spread 
throughout the sample period and for which the control variables are balanced. In short, we find that the 
Fortune List produces results which are compatible with those based on the KLD employee treatment 
score. However, we caution against using the Fortune List as the basis of primary analysis except where the 
focus of analysis is on good employment practice, rather than good versus bad, and where the treatment 
and control firms are clearly comparable. 
[Insert Table 9 near here] 
4.10 The Effect of Employee Treatment Strengths, Concerns and Abnormal Net Hiring on Employee Productivity 
and Profitability 
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To observe how employee treatment strengths and concerns affect firms’ labor productivity and 
profitability we divide the employee treatment measure into employee treatment strengths (EMP STR) and 
employee treatment concerns (EMP CON). In light of previous argument, we predict that the strengths of 
employee treatment are more likely to enhance firms’ labor productivity and profitability and therefore are 
positively associated with employee productivity proxies and ROA, whereas the concerns of employee 
treatment pose a misalignment between the interests of employees and a firm’s objective and therefore tend 
to be negatively associated with employee productivity proxies and ROA. 
In Table 12, our results show a marginal significant relationship between employee strengths and 
labor productivity measured as net income per employee. Overall there is little to suggest that firms with 
employee-friendly policies may have higher labor productivity. For other types of labor productivity and 
profitability measures, we do not find significant results. In contrast, when we test the impact of employee 
concerns on labor productivity and profitability, we find that the estimated coefficients of labor productivity 
as measured by gross profit per employee (GPROFIT) and net income per employee (NETINCOME) and 
profitability (ROA) are significantly negative, suggesting that firms with employee concerns are more likely 
to have lower labor productivity and profitability. Apart from above, our results still show that abnormal 
net hiring significantly lower firms’ labor productivity and profitability. 
[Insert Table 10 near here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
In our sample, total wages and salaries are approximately 1/3 the value of firms’ revenues. This suggests 
that the efficiency with which labor is managed is crucial to a firm’s prospects. Further, whilst CSR is 
important to various stakeholders, it can hardly be more important than to the employees as it impacts 
directly on their working lives. We argue that the case for the potential importance of employee treatment 
to wealth creation and corporate social responsibility is apparent. In this paper, we examine employee 
relevant CSR, employee treatment, and assess the impact of that treatment on firm efficiency. We 
investigate two related outcomes. The first, labor investment efficiency, assumes that competitive markets 
drive firms towards optimal recruitment policies and that divergence from that norm will tend to signal 
inefficiency. Whilst this is consistent with previous research into investment efficiency in general, it need 
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not always hold true. It is clearly feasible that apparent underinvestment in labor might result from efficient 
workforce management or that apparent overinvestment might be rational investment in future growth. 
This leads to our second focus of attention: productivity and performance. We examine whether labor 
investment efficiency does indeed link to productivity, and hence firm performance, and whether employee 
treatment directly impacts on firm performance. 
We find that employee treatment is negatively associated with the absolute levels of abnormal net 
hiring. The better the employee treatment scores, the less likely is over or under-invest in labor, indicating 
better labor investment efficiency. When we analyze employee treatment strengths and concerns, we find 
relatively weak evidence that employee treatment strengths effectively improve labor investment efficiency, 
whereas we find strong evidence that employee treatment concerns distort normal labor investment, and 
particularly leads to labor underinvestment. Our data does not offer an opportunity to investigate this 
further, but it would clearly be a route for continuing research. For example, is this labor investment 
efficiency driven by employee decisions such as an increasing propensity to leave or a reluctance to join, by 
failures of the firm’s human resource management, or by agency issues as argued by the investment 
efficiency literature? Whatever the underlying cause our results suggest that the economic impact of the 
inefficiency is considerable. Approximately one-third of our sample do not score a net zero (strengths 
minus concerns) and our results, taken at face value, imply that approximately 1 in 10 net changes in 
employment for this sub-sample are driven by the firm’s employee treatment practices. This is clearly 
consistent with economic significance.  
Regarding productivity and performance, we find that labor investment inefficiency, as measured 
by absolute abnormal hiring, is negatively related to sales, gross profit and net profit, all scaled by number 
of employees, and also to return on assets. Employee treatment is also positively related to the same 
variables except for sales per employee. Again, the result appears to be driven by employee treatment 
concerns rather than strengths, and again a case can be made for economic as well as statistical significance. 
A net strength or concern of one, which covers almost a third of the sample, indicates an impact on return 
on assets of half a percentage point, which contrasts with a mean of 4.4 percent. Whilst this may not be 
crucial to a firm’s survival, this is a strong a result. It would be contentious to argue that human resource 
practices would make a more profound impact over a large sample of firms.  
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Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and continue to hold when we adopt 
instrumental variable estimation, alternative measures for employee treatment and labor investment 
efficiency as well as additional control variables. However, in a panel data setting, typical for archival 
research of this type, it is difficult to demonstrate causality without the benefit of an exogenous shock. We 
have followed previous research in the selection of sensitivity tests and we additionally decided to use firm-
fixed effects, rather than the more usual industry fixed effects, as being less susceptible to endogeneity. 
However, we also found the use of a placebo test helpful. By replicating our analysis with a variety of CSR 
categories not immediately relevant to employment issues, and by demonstrating that these dimensions did 
not repeat the significant results of our employee treatment variable, we provide additional evidence that 
our results do not come from a broad range of CSR practices of which employee treatment is just an 
example. Hence, the often-argued criticism that CSR’s association with performance is driven by reverse 
causality or omitted variables, such as managerial skills or strategic advantages, does not seem to apply in 
this case. 
Taken together, our findings highlight the important role of employee treatment in contributing to 
firms’ labor investment behavior, performance and value creation. We have no direct evidence that benign 
“employee treatment” as measured by KLD is valued by employees but our results are weakly consistent 
with that contention. Our results are more strongly consistent with the reverse case: bad employee 
treatment is detrimental. It is only one interpretation of our results, albeit the obvious one, but where 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 




All COMPUSTAT firms for fiscal years 1991-2016 (exclude firms with 
negative assets, negative sales and stockholders equity and missing 
historical SIC codes) 
290,288 
Less:   
Observations in financial industries (SIC 60-69) (70,299) 
Merged with total stock returns data from CRSP (84,907) 
Missing observations to estimate abnormal net hiring in Model 1 (24,257) 
Sample for estimating Model 1 (Pinnuck and Lillies, 2007) 96,221 
                




Merged with dataset in Model 1 and unmatched observations  (3,159) 
Sample for estimating Model 2 (Primary baseline regression) 20,583 
Less:  
Missing observations in Model 3 
(6,902) 
Sample for estimating Model 3 (Productivity and Profitability regression) 13,681 
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Table 2, Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Model 2 and Model 3 
 





             
AB_NETHIREit 20,583  0.122 0.075 0.181 0.037 0.137 
OVER_LABORit 6,527 0.162 0.072 0.273 0.028 0.169 
UNDER_LABORit 14,056 -0.103 -0.076 0.110 -0.130 -0.040 
EMP_TREATit 20,583 -0.035 0.000 0.768 0.000 0.000 
MTBit-1 20,583 3.206 2.263 3.930 1.479 3.725 
SIZEit-1 20,583 7.253 7.117 1.558 6.100 8.275 
LIQit-1 20,583 1.870 1.240 2.063 0.770 2.136 
LEVit-1 20,583 0.243 0.206 0.247 0.032 0.356 
DIVDit-1 20,583 0.469 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
TANGIBLESit-1 20,583 0.289 0.213 0.237 0.099 0.428 
LOSSit-1 20,583 0.209 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 
LABINTit-1 20,583 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.006 
SD_CFOit-1 20,583 0.053 0.037 0.058 0.022 0.062 
SD_SALESit-1 20,583 0.144 0.103 0.135 0.060 0.180 
SD_NETHIREit-1 20,583 0.177 0.111 0.237 0.061 0.201 
UNIONit-1 20,583 0.104 0.074 0.089 0.040 0.143 
INVESTit 20,583 0.108 0.084 0.171 0.046 0.120 
NETINCOMEit 13,681 5.682 5.640 0.880 5.190 6.130 
SALESit 13,374 4.637 4.673 1.030 4.047 5.248 
GPROFITit 11,149 2.902 2.930 1.374 2.080 3.762 
ROAit-1 13,627 0.044 0.054 0.127 0.017 0.097 
GOVERNit-1 13,681 -0.274 0.000 0.687 -1.000 0.000 
CAPXit-1 13,681 0.055 0.038 0.058 0.020 0.068 





Table 2, Panel B: Mean Abnormal Net Hiring and Employee 
Treatment Scores by Year 
Year N AB_NETHIRE EMP_TREAT 
    
1995 299 0.111 0.271 
1996 303 0.102 0.274 
1997 313 0.098 0.307 
1998 323 0.120 0.390 
1999 324 0.121 0.383 
2000 326 0.125 0.374 
2001 494 0.150 0.231 
2002 642 0.103 0.106 
2003 1,375 0.137 -0.149 
2004 1,432 0.141 -0.235 
2005 1,285 0.129 -0.270 
2006 1,276 0.126 -0.313 
2007 1,218 0.123 -0.286 
2008 1,348 0.119 -0.279 
2009 1,409 0.128 -0.238 
2010 1,471 0.127 -0.011 
2011 1,429 0.117 0.013 
2012 1,424 0.112 0.100 
2013 1,437 0.110 0.174 
2014 1,333 0.112 0.140 
2015 1,122 0.113 0.199 
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Table 2, Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Employee-Friendly versus Non-Employee-Friendly Firms 
 





 N Mean Median 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-test W-Test 
Dependent Variables              
AB_NETHIREit 3,136 0.106 0.070  13,373 0.124 0.075  4,074 0.128 0.082  < 0.001 < 0.001 
OVER_LABORit 911 0.133 0.061  4,479  0.168 0.076  1,136 0.172 0.071  < 0.001 < 0.001 
UNDER_LABORit 2,216 -0.095 -0.074  8,954 -0.104 -0.075  2,938 -0.110 -0.085  < 0.001 < 0.001 
Test Variable               
EMP_TREATit 3,136 1.275 1.000  13,373 0.000 0.000  4,074 -1.159 -1.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
Control Variables               
MTBit-1 3,136 3.823 2.653  13,373 3.154 2.219  4,074 2.904 2.167  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SIZEit-1 3,136 8.286 8.355  13,373 7.034 6.903  4,074 7.179 7.072  < 0.001 < 0.001 
LIQit-1 3,136 1.684 1.158  13,373 1.961 1.313  4,074 1.713 1.102  < 0.001 0.022 
LEVit-1 3,136 0.239 0.210  13,373 0.239 0.195  4,074 0.261 0.231  0.511 0.004 
DIVDit-1 3,136 0.598 1.000  13,373 0.431 0.000  4,074 0.496 0.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
TANGIBLESit-1 3,136 0.313 0.249  13,373 0.276 0.197   4,074 0.313 0.249  0.849 0.581 
LOSSit-1 3,136 0.136 0.000  13,373 0.214 0.000   4,074 0.246 0.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
INVESTit 3,136 0.094 0.072  13,373 0.113 0.086  4,074 0.103 0.085  0.004 < 0.001 
SD_CFOit-1 3,136 0.046 0.034  13,373 0.055 0.038   4,074 0.054 0.037  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SD_SALESit-1 3,136 0.120 0.091  13,373 0.147 0.105  4,074 0.152 0.108  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SD_NETHIREit-1 3,136 0.151 0.091  13,373 0.179 0.114  4,074 0.191 0.116  < 0.001 < 0.001 
UNIONit-1 3,136 0.126 0.093  13,373 0.099 0.074  4,074 0.105 0.078  < 0.001 < 0.001 
LABINTit-1 3,136 0.005 0.002  13,373 0.006 0.003  4,074 0.007 0.004  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SALESit 2,253 5.819 5.763  8,774 5.684 5.652  2,654 5.560 5.507  < 0.001 < 0.001 
GPROFITit 2,212 4.916 4.927  8,555 4.651  4.698  2,607 4.355 4.381  < 0.001 < 0.001 
NETINCOMEit 1,939 3.302  3.384  7,093 2.885 2.915  2,117 2.590 2.624  < 0.001 < 0.001 
ROAit 2,253  0.062   0.065  8,774 0.042 0.052  2,654  0.039 0.048  < 0.001 < 0.001 
GOVERNANCEit-1 2,253  -0.300 0.000  8,774 -0.247 0.000   2,654 -0.342 0.000  0.031 0.034 




Table 3: Correlation Matrix. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. AB_NETHIREit-1 1           
2. EMP_TREATit -0.032*** 1          
3. MTBit-1 0.023*** 0.073*** 1         
4. SIZEit-1 -0.108*** 0.190*** 0.192*** 1        
5. LIQit-1 0.146*** 0.009 0.051*** -0.198*** 1       
6. LEVit-1 0.036*** -0.036*** -0.018*** 0.108*** -0.224*** 1      
7. DIVDit-1 -0.123*** 0.049*** -0.013* 0.369*** -0.268*** 0.046*** 1     
8. TANGIBLESit-1 -0.072*** -0.013* -0.114*** 0.147*** -0.327*** 0.255*** 0.251*** 1    
9. LOSSit-1 0.102*** -0.077*** -0.017** -0.300*** 0.161*** 0.057*** -0.272*** -0.079*** 1   
10. LABINTit-1 -0.038*** -0.064*** 0.004 -0.100*** -0.105*** -0.087*** 0.019*** 0.026*** -0.067*** 1  
11. INVESTit 0.332*** -0.013* 0.064*** -0.093*** 0.074*** 0.040*** -0.096*** -0.041*** 0.088*** -0.027*** 1 
12. SD_CFOit-1 0.170*** -0.034*** 0.159*** -0.289*** 0.253*** -0.075*** -0.275*** -0.227*** 0.266*** -0.036*** 0.200*** 
13. SD_SALESit-1 0.097*** -0.064*** 0.029*** -0.199*** 0.002 0.001 -0.147*** -0.184*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.081*** 
14 SD_NETHIREit-1 0.141*** -0.051*** 0.000 -0.109*** 0.069*** 0.108*** -0.184*** -0.083*** 0.133*** -0.053*** 0.070*** 
15. UNIONit-1 -0.020 0.054*** -0.067*** 0.095*** -0.026*** 0.061*** 0.136*** 0.205*** -0.031*** -0.155*** -0.047*** 
16. SALESit -0.040 0.080*** -0.024*** 0.200*** -0.100*** 0.097*** 0.086*** 0.134*** -0.074*** -0.498*** -0.009 
17. GPROFITit -0.002 0.145*** 0.110*** 0.191*** 0.132*** 0.043*** -0.040*** -0.020*** -0.010 -0.528*** 0.043*** 
18. NETINCOMEit 0.001 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.281*** 0.161*** 0.023*** 0.045*** 0.075*** -0.100*** -0.460*** 0.029*** 
19. ROAit-1 -0.149*** 0.072*** 0.053*** 0.234*** -0.154*** -0.077*** 0.189*** 0.045*** -0.430*** 0.086*** -0.223*** 
20. GOVERNANCEit-1 -0.002 0.010 -0.037*** -0.199*** 0.038*** -0.027*** 0.028*** 0.061*** 0.007 0.027*** 0.011 
21. CAPXit-1 -0.040*** 0.059*** -0.019*** 0.387*** -0.112*** 0.051*** 0.179*** 0.233*** -0.077*** -0.064*** -0.034*** 




           
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
12. SD_CFOit-1 1          
13. SD_SALESit-1 0.335*** 1         
14 SD_NETHIREit-1 0.161*** 0.205*** 1        
15. UNIONit-1 -0.095*** -0.076*** -0.001 1       
16. SALESit -0.019*** 0.083*** -0.005 0.101*** 1      
17. GPROFITit 0.104*** -0.069*** 0.013* -0.007 0.811*** 1     
18. NETINCOMEit 0.103*** -0.095*** 0.002 0.098*** 0.708*** 0.794*** 1    
19. ROAit-1 -0.316*** -0.032*** -0.133*** 0.013* 0.150*** 0.123*** 0.447*** 1   
20. GOVERNANCEit-1 0.032*** -0.001 -0.016** 0.042*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.013* 1  
21. CAPXit-1 -0.099*** -0.067*** -0.042*** 0.085*** 0.209*** 0.161*** 0.175*** 0.041*** -0.054*** 1 
           
This table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation between all variables included in Equation 2 and Equation 3. 
*, **, ***indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. 
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EMP_TREATit -0.00616*** -0.0131** 0.00440*** -0.00377*** -0.00693** 
 (-2.98) (-1.99) (2.75) (-2.91) (-2.27) 
MTBit-1 0.000293 0.00305** 0.000647 -0.000482 -0.00130* 
 (0.52) (2.58) (1.39) (-1.34) (-1.69) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0888*** -0.134* 0.0534** -0.0178 -0.0750 
 (-3.26) (-1.74) (2.48) (-1.68) (-1.43) 
LIQit-1 0.00898*** 0.0123*** -0.00217 0.0114*** 0.00486 
 (4.64) (2.93) (-1.21) (4.13) (1.51) 
LEVit-1 0.0351*** 0.0552* -0.0562*** 0.0363*** 0.0353** 
 (3.28) (1.77) (-6.97) (5.54) (2.13) 
DIVDit-1 0.00724 0.00758 -0.00683* -0.0147*** -0.000379 
 (1.20) (0.38) (-1.83) (-3.59) (-0.04) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0609** -0.0795 0.0520** -0.00848 -0.0542 
 (-2.16) (-1.20) (1.99) (-1.22) (-1.20) 
LOSSit-1 -0.00356 -0.00344 -0.00710** 0.0151** 0.000421 
 (-0.83) (-0.27) (-2.08) (2.10) (0.06) 
LABINTit-1 -1.935** -11.12*** -2.224*** -0.402*** -2.264** 
 (-2.11) (-3.79) (-4.37) (-2.94) (-2.01) 
INVESTit 0.325*** 0.425*** -0.234*** 0.368*** 0.430*** 
 (5.49) (10.43) (-5.15) (8.63) (9.44) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0209 0.0301 -0.0252 0.0876*** 0.0692 
 (0.32) (0.23) (-0.47) (1.94) (0.67) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0132 0.0374 0.0241* 0.0704** 0.0248 
 (0.68) (0.66) (1.69) (2.70) (0.68) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.154*** -0.302*** 0.00940 0.0606*** -0.230*** 
 (-8.47) (-6.86) (1.24) (4.65) (-4.64) 
UNIONit-1 0.0349 0.0588 0.0183 -0.00125 0.109* 
 (0.89) (0.46) (0.63) (-0.09) (1.74) 
      
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
N 20,583 6,527 14,056 20,583 7,210 
Adjusted R2 25.4% 31.4% 28.5% 18.0% 30.9% 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. All test statistics and 
significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at 





Table 5: The Effect of CSR Dimensions on Abnormal Net Hiring 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ENVIRONit-1 0.00123      
 (0.68)      
COMMUNit-1  -0.0000272     
  (-0.01)     
EMP_RELit-1   -0.00482***    
   (-3.18)    
DIVERSITYit-1    -0.00221   
    (-1.48)   
PRODUCTit-1     0.000668  
    
 (0.25)  
RIGHTSit-1      0.00124 
    
  (0.25) 
MTBit-1 0.000300 0.000297 0.000275 0.000281 0.000296 0.000298 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.49) (0.50) (0.53) (0.53) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0888*** -0.0882*** -0.0872*** -0.0860*** -0.0883*** -0.0883*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.23) (-3.20) (-3.14) (-3.23) (-3.24) 
LIQit-1 0.00897*** 0.00899*** 0.00902*** 0.00897*** 0.00898*** 0.00898*** 
 (4.62) (4.64) (4.67) (4.63) (4.64) (4.64) 
LEVit-1 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 0.0352*** 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 
 (3.26) (3.27) (3.28) (3.28) (3.27) (3.27) 
DIVDit-1 0.00729 0.00727 0.00747 0.00729 0.00727 0.00730 
 (1.21) (1.20) (1.24) (1.21) (1.20) (1.21) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0617** -0.0618** -0.0603** -0.0612** -0.0619** -0.0621** 
 (-2.19) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-2.20) (-2.21) 
LOSSit-1 -0.00308 -0.00308 -0.00349 -0.00296 -0.00307 -0.00308 
 (-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.81) (-0.69) (-0.72) (-0.72) 
LABINTit-1 -1.962** -1.954** -1.894** -1.940** -1.955** -1.956** 
 (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
INVESTit 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 
 (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0227 0.0228 0.0205 0.0217 0.0228 0.0227 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0138 0.0136 0.0131 0.0136 0.0136 0.0136 
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** 
 (-8.50) (-8.51) (-8.49) (-8.54) (-8.51) (-8.51) 
UNIONit-1 0.0297 0.0304 0.0330 0.0308 0.0304 0.0304 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.85) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 
Adjusted R2 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 
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*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-




Table 6: The Effect of Employee Treatment Strengths and Concerns on Abnormal Net Hiring, 



























EMP_STRit -0.00463 -0.0147* 0.00168    
 (-1.59) (-1.75) (0.74)    
EMP_CONit    0.00615
*** 0.0107 -0.00673*** 
    (2.61) (1.15) (-3.28) 
MTBit-1 0.000289 0.00306*** 0.000656 0.000433 0.00308*** 0.000638 
 (0.51) (2.59) (1.41) (0.99) (2.60) (1.37) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0872*** -0.131* 0.0524** -0.0688*** -0.136* 0.0548** 
 (-3.20) (-1.70) (2.43) (-3.32) (-1.78) (2.54) 
LIQit-1 0.00898*** 0.0123*** -0.00219 0.00773*** 0.0124*** -0.00216 
 (4.63) (2.92) (-1.22) (5.75) (2.96) (-1.21) 
LEVit-1 0.0350*** 0.0549* -0.0562*** 0.0304*** 0.0549* -0.0562*** 
 (3.27) (1.76) (-6.97) (3.70) (1.76) (-6.97) 
DIVDit-1 0.00749 0.00812 -0.00699* 0.00717 0.00699 -0.00648* 
 (1.24) (0.40) (-1.88) (1.64) (0.35) (-1.74) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0607** -0.0781 0.0523** -0.0511** -0.0808 0.0536** 
 (-2.15) (-1.17) (2.00) (-2.30) (-1.21) (2.05) 
LOSSit-1 -0.00313 -0.00262 -0.00751** -0.00156 -0.00334 -0.00696** 
 (-0.73) (-0.21) (-2.20) (-0.47) (-0.26) (-2.04) 
LABINTit-1 -1.951** -11.12*** -2.212*** -0.659 -11.13*** -2.230*** 
 (-2.13) (-3.78) (-4.36) (-1.04) (-3.79) (-4.39) 
INVESTit 0.325*** 0.425*** -0.234*** 0.244*** 0.424*** -0.234*** 
 (5.49) (10.42) (-5.16) (5.92) (10.43) (-5.16) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0232 0.0347 -0.0262 0.00403 0.0326 -0.0237 
 (0.36) (0.27) (-0.49) (0.08) (0.25) (-0.44) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0134 0.0386 0.0241* 0.000511 0.0392 0.0241* 
 (0.69) (0.68) (1.69) (0.03) (0.69) (1.69) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.154*** -0.302*** 0.00927 -0.0917*** -0.302*** 0.00945 
 (-8.49) (-6.88) (1.22) (-7.92) (-6.89) (1.25) 
UNIONit-1 0.0310 0.0514 0.0213 0.0235 0.0576 0.0175 
 (0.80) (0.40) (0.73) (0.75) (0.45) (0.60) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,583 6,527 14,056 20,583 6,527 14,056 
Adjusted R2 25.4% 31.4% 28.2% 25.2% 31.4% 28.3% 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-





















     
EMP_TREATit-1 0.000815 0.0191** 0.0369*** 0.00527*** 
 (0.13) (2.45) (2.59) (3.64) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0912*** -0.191*** -0.0340*** 
 (-3.87) (-2.73) (-3.13) (-3.54) 
SIZEit-1 0.501*** 0.810*** 2.622*** 0.129*** 
 (4.67) (7.08) (10.94) (5.32) 
LIQit-1 -0.0317*** -0.00893 0.00903 -0.000966 
 (-3.72) (-1.41) (0.74) (-0.63) 
LEVit-1 -0.0657** -0.0234 -0.360*** -0.0336*** 
 (-2.19) (-0.60) (-4.40) (-2.86) 
MTBit-1 -0.000717 0.00179 0.0145*** 0.00306*** 
 (-0.38) (0.84) (3.82) (4.86) 
PPEit-1 0.0391 0.140 -0.568*** -0.0235 
 (0.30) (1.01) (-2.24) (-1.00) 
INVESTit-1 -0.269** -0.209*** -0.382*** -0.0338* 
 (-7.47) (-6.33) (-3.97) (-1.89) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0261** -0.0420*** -0.318*** -0.0163*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.78) (-7.60) (-4.29) 
SALESGROWTH1it-1 0.309*** 0.207*** 0.435*** 0.0577*** 
 (10.41) (5.56) (7.32) (7.61) 
SALESGROWTH2it-1 0.170*** 0.128*** 0.218*** 0.0314*** 
 (5.42) (4.51) (4.28) (5.57) 
GOVERNANCEit-1 0.00542 0.0133** -0.00811 0.00306** 
 (1.06) (2.00) (-0.57) (2.03) 
CAPXit-1 -0.276* -0.332 0.601 0.118*** 
 (-1.67) (-1.48) (1.52) (2.74) 
  
   
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,681 13,374 11,149 13,681 
Adjusted R2 92.9% 92.2% 77.5% 57.8% 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. All test statistics and 
























ENVIRONit-1 -0.0119** -0.00329 -0.000619 -0.00136 
 (-2.44) (-0.50) (-0.05) (-1.29) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0919*** -0.192*** -0.0342*** 
  (-3.90) (-2.76) (-3.14) (-3.55) 
COMMUNit-1 -0.0150* 0.00252 0.0192 -0.00326* 
 (-1.77) (0.24) (0.98) (-1.71) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0918*** -0.192*** -0.0342*** 
  (-3.89) (-2.75) (-3.12) (-3.56) 
EMP_RELit-1 -0.00386 0.00764 0.0181* 0.00386*** 
 (-0.91) (1.38) (1.86) (3.81) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0913*** -0.191*** -0.0339*** 
  (-3.88) (-2.74) (-3.12) (-3.53) 
DIVERSITYit-1 0.00645* -0.0001 0.00543 -0.00167* 
 (1.79) (-0.02) (0.59) (-1.69) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.115*** -0.0918*** -0.192*** -0.0343*** 
  (-3.86) (-2.76) (-3.13) (-3.57) 
PRODUCTit-1 0.0009 0.0188** 0.0382** 0.00240 
 (0.06) (2.05) (2.14) (1.33) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0912*** -0.191*** -0.0341*** 
  (-3.87) (-2.73) (-3.12) (-3.54) 
RIGHTSit-1 -0.0001 0.0162 -0.0169 -0.00969*** 
 (-0.01) (0.75) (-0.51) (-3.67) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0921*** -0.192*** -0.0341*** 
  (-3.87) (-2.77) (-3.13) (-3.54) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,681 13,374 11,149 13,681 
Adjusted R2 92.9% 92.2% 77.5% 57.8% 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-




Table 9: PSM test of Fortune Best100 versus controls 
        
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference   T-stat N 
        
EMP_TREAT Unmatched 0.933 -0.053 0.986   26.84  
 ATT 0.933 0.207 0.726   10.55
*** 435 
        
ET_STRENGTH Unmatched 1.260 0.243 1.016   36.94  
 ATT 1.260 0.579 0.680  11.10
*** 435 
        
ET_CONCERN Unmatched 0.326 0.296 0.030   1.13  
 ATT 0.326 0.372 -0.046   -1.11 435 
        
AB_NETHIRE Unmatched 0.088 0.123 -0.034   -3.82  
 ATT 0.088 0.105 -0.017   -1.91
* 435 
        
SALES Unmatched 5.673 5.743 -0.070   -1.59  
 ATT 5.673 5.515 0.157   2.55
*** 414 
        
GROSS PROFIT Unmatched 3.208 2.918 0.290   4.13  
 ATT 3.208 2.962 0.246   2.63
*** 414 
        
NET INCOME Unmatched 4.862 4.708 0.154   3.01  
 ATT 4.862 4.591 0.271   3.46
*** 414 
        
ROA Unmatched 0.118 0.084 0.034   9.70  
 ATT 0.118 0.107 0.011     2.28
** 414 
        
Cases are matched using a probit regression of inclusion in of the Fortune 100 Best Firms to Work For 
with size, industry, leverage, market-to-book, loss dummy, and 5-year standard deviation of sales as the 
statistically significant variables. Treated and Controls reports the mean values for the unmatched and 
matched samples (designated ATT which identifies the average treatment effect on the treated). Here 
firms are matched by the nearest neighbor without replacement.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. 
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Return on Assets 
 
      
  
EMP_STRit-1 0.0100 0.0120 0.0326* 0.00206     
 (1.17) (1.09) (1.77) (0.98)     
EMP_CONit-1     0.00820 -0.0250** -0.0392** -0.00814*** 
     (1.14) (-2.49) (-1.97) (-4.33) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.116*** -0.0917*** -0.192*** -0.0342*** -0.116*** -0.0913*** -0.192*** -0.0340*** 
 (-3.87) (-2.75) (-3.13) (-3.55) (-3.88) (-2.74) (-3.13) (-3.54) 
SIZEit-1 0.498*** 0.803*** 2.609*** 0.128*** 0.497*** 0.818*** 2.632*** 0.131*** 
 (4.64) (7.02) (10.87) (5.27) (4.65) (7.14) (10.99) (5.41) 
LIQit-1 -0.0317*** -0.00878 0.00935 -0.000947 -0.0316*** -0.00888 0.00928 -0.000965 
 (-3.73) (-1.39) (0.76) (-0.62) (-3.71) (-1.41) (0.76) (-0.63) 
LEVit-1 -0.0657** -0.0233 -0.360*** -0.0335*** -0.0655** -0.0233 -0.359*** -0.0336*** 
 (-2.19) (-0.60) (-4.39) (-2.85) (-2.18) (-0.60) (-4.39) (-2.87) 
MTBit-1 -0.000706 0.00185 0.0147*** 0.00307*** -0.000688 0.00175 0.0146*** 0.00304*** 
 (-0.38) (0.87) (3.87) (4.88) (-0.37) (0.82) (3.83) (4.83) 
PPEit-1 0.0357 0.143 -0.567** -0.0222 0.0396 0.148 -0.545** -0.0216 
 (0.27) (1.04) (-2.23) (-0.95) (0.30) (1.06) (-2.13) (-0.92) 
INVESTit-1 -0.269*** -0.209*** -0.381*** -0.0335* -0.269*** -0.209*** -0.380*** -0.0338* 
 (-7.47) (-6.30) (-3.97) (-1.87) (-7.46) (-6.33) (-3.97) (-1.89) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0261** -0.0434*** -0.321*** -0.0167*** -0.0267** -0.0417*** -0.319*** -0.0161*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.87) (-7.65) (-4.37) (-2.34) (-2.76) (-7.60) (-4.24) 
SALES_G1it-1 0.309*** 0.208*** 0.436*** 0.0578*** 0.309*** 0.207*** 0.435*** 0.0577*** 
 (10.41) (5.58) (7.31) (7.61) (10.42) (5.56) (7.31) (7.63) 
SALES_G2it-1 0.170*** 0.128*** 0.219*** 0.0314*** 0.170*** 0.127*** 0.217*** 0.0313*** 
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 (5.43) (4.50) (4.30) (5.58) (5.42) (4.46) (4.27) (5.56) 
GOVERNit-1 0.00515 0.0134** -0.00831 0.00314** 0.00542 0.0139** -0.00647 0.00322** 
 (1.01) (2.02) (-0.58) (2.07) (1.07) (2.09) (-0.45) (2.13) 
CAPXit-1 -0.275* -0.335 0.600 0.118*** -0.277* -0.335 0.595 0.118*** 
 (-1.66) (-1.50) (1.52) (2.71) (-1.68) (-1.49) (1.50) (2.72) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,374 11,149 13,681 13,681 13,374 11,149 13,681 13,374 
Adjusted R2 92.2% 77.5% 57.8% 92.9% 92.2% 77.5% 57.9% 92.2% 
This table presents the results from regressing employee treatment strengths (EMP_STR), concerns (EMP_CON) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on 
various per employee productivity measures (SALES, GPROFIT and NETINCOME) and profitability (ROA).  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted 
by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
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Appendix 1: Description (COMPUSTAT data items in parentheses) 
 
 
Model 1 Variables:  
NET_HIREit 
Percentage change in the number of employees (EMP) from year t-1 to year t 
for firm i. 
SALES_Git Percentage change in sales (REVT) in year t for firm i.  
ROAit Return on assets (NI / lag(AT)) in year t for firm i. 
ΔROAit Change in return on assets in year t for firm. 
RETURNit Total stock return during fiscal year t for firm i.  
SIZEit-1 
Natural log of market value (CSHO* PRCC_F) at the end of fiscal year t-1 
for firm i. 
SIZE_Pit-1 Percentile rank of SIZEit-1 
LIQit-1 Quick ratio ((CHE + RECT) / LCT) at the end of year t -1 for firm i.  
ΔLIQit-1 Percentage change in the quick ratio in year t for firm i.  
LEVit-1 
Leverage for firm I, measured as the sum of debt in current liabilities and 
total long-term debt (DLC + DLTT) at the end of year t-1, divided by year t-
1 total assets.  
LOSSBINit-1 
There are five separate loss bins to indicate each 0.005 interval of ROA from 
0 to -0.025 in period t-1 for firm i. LOSSBIN1 is equal to 1 if ROA ranges 
from -0.005 to 0. 
Model 2 Variables:  
EMP_TREATit Employee treatment score from KLD database. 
DIVDit-1 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm paid dividends (DVPSPS_F) in year 
t-1. 
TANGIBLESit-1 Property, plant and equipment (PPENT) at the end of year t-1, divided by 
total assets at year t-1, for firm i. 
LOSSit-1 Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm I had negative ROA for year t-1.  
LABINTit-1 Labor intensity, measured as the number of employees divided by total assets 
at the end of year t-1 for firm i.  
INVESTit 
Abnormal other (non-labor) investments, defined as the absolute magnitude 
of the residual from the following model: INVESTit = β0 + β1SALES_Git-1 
+ εit, where INVEST is the sum of capital expenditure (CAPX), acquisition 
expenditure (AQC), and research and development expenditure (XRD), less 
cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment (SPPE), all 
scaled by lagged total assets.  
SD_CFOit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's cash flows from operation (OANCF) from year 
t-5 to t-1.  
SD_SALESit-1 Standard deviation of firm i's sales from year t-5 to t-1.  
SD_NETHIREit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's change in the number of employees from year 
t-5 to t-1.  
UNIONit-1 Industry-level rate of labor unionization for year t-1. 
Model 3 Variables:  
NETINCOMEit Employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of net income (NI) 
divided by the number of employee (EMP). 
SALESit Employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of sales (REVT) 
divided by the number of employee (EMP). 
GPROFITit 
Employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of sales (REVT) 
minus cost of goods sold (COGS) divided by the number of employee 
(EMP). 
HERFDit-1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (3-digit SIC) based on firm's sales. 
GOVERNit-1 Corporate governance score from KLD database. 
CAPXit-1 The ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to total assets (AT). 
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Other Variables:  
BEST100it Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm is listed in Fortune magazine's list of 
the "100 best companies to work for" in year t. 
ENVIRONit-1 Environment score from KLD database.  
COMMUNit-1 Community score from KLD database. 
EMP_RELit-1 Employee relation score from KLD database. 
DIVERSITYit-1 Diversity score from KLD database. 
PRODUCTit-1 Product score from KLD database. 
RIGHTSit-1 Human rights score from KLD database.  
AB_DISCit-1 
Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. (2005). We estimate the 
model for every industry classified by two-digit SIC code for each year and 
capture the residuals. The absolute value of discretionary accrual, AB_DISC, 
is used as the proxy for financial reporting quality. The large value of the 
absolute value of discretionary accrual, the lower level of financial reporting 
quality. We further multiply AB_DISC by -1 so that large value of AB_DISC 
indicates higher-quality of financial reporting. 
DD_DISCit-1 
Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the Dechow and Dichiev (2002) 
model as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al (2005). We estimate 
the model for every industry classified by two-digit SIC code for each year 
and capture the residuals. We then compute the standard deviation of firm i's 
residuals over the years t-5 to t-1. We further multiply that standard deviation 
by -1 so that large value indicates higher-quality of financial reporting.(see 
references?) 







Appendix 2a: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Model 1 
 N Mean Median Std.Dev 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Variable              
NET_HIREit 96,221 0.091 0.028 0.349  -0.050 0.149 
SALES_GRit 96,221 0.187 0.078 0.634  -0.032 0.233 
SALES_Git-1 96,221 0.256 0.092 0.812 -0.019 0.266 
ΔROAit 96,221 0.004 0.006 0.190 -0.038 0.044 
ΔROAit-1 96,221 -0.000 0.006 0.212 -0.038 0.045 
ROAit 96,221 -0.032 0.032 0.258 -0.054 0.083 
RETURNit 96,221 0.146 0.002  0.801 -0.294 0.328 
SIZEit-1 96,221 5.615 5.524  2.222 3.971 7.138 
LIQit-1 96,221 2.121 1.265 2.584 0.770 2.343 
ΔLIQit-1 96,221 0.243 -0.000 1.182 -0.208 0.256 
ΔLIQit 96,221 0.106 -0.021 0.823 -0.229 0.202 
LEVit-1 96,221 0.256 0.195 0.282 0.025 0.378 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 96,507 firm-year observations over the period 
between 1991 and 2016. This table presents the number of observations, the mean, the median, the 
standard deviation, the values for the first and the third quartile for all the variables in Equation 1.  
The primary estimate of expected net hiring is based on the model of Pinnuck and Lillies (2007). 
NET_HIRE is the percentage change in employee. SALE_GROWTH is the percentage change in sale 
revenue. ROA is net income scaled by beginning of the year total asset. RETURN is the annual stock 
return for year t. SIZE_R is the log of market value of equity at the beginning of the year, ranked into 
percentiles. LIQ is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities. 
LEV is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
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Appendix 2b. Regression Reults (Dependent Variable = NET_HIRE) 
 Expected Sign Coefficient (t-stat) 
SALESGROWTHit + 0.2157*** 
  (46.87) 
SALESGROWTHit-1 + 0.0255*** 
  (10.66) 
ROAit + 0.1474*** 
  (17.68) 
ΔROAit - -0.2384*** 
  (-23.52) 
ΔROAit-1 + 0.0407*** 
  (4.95) 
RETURNit + 0.0414*** 
  (22.94) 
SIZE_Pit-1 + 0.0478*** 
  (10.85) 
LIQit-1 + 0.0069*** 
  (10.76) 
ΔLIQit +/- -0.0089*** 
  (-4.33) 
ΔLIQit-1 + 0.0225*** 
  (14.63) 
LEVit-1 +/- -0.0101* 
  (-1.91) 
LOSSBIN1it-1 - -0.0230*** 
  (-2.96) 
LOSSBIN2it-1 - -0.0386*** 
  (-5.37) 
LOSSBIN3it-1 - -0.0312*** 
  (-3.75) 
LOSSBIN4it-1 - -0.0262*** 
  (-3.16) 
LOSSBIN5it-1 - -0.0365*** 
  (-4.34) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
N  96,211 
Adjusted R2  21.4% 
This table presents the results from regressing the percentage change in employees on variables 
capturing underlying economic fundamentals over the period between 1991 and 2016. t-statistics are 
calculated using Newey-West corrected standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
 
 52 

















































EMP_TREATit  -0.0325***  -0.0137  0.1205
***  0.0368
*  0.0015 
 
 (-3.00)  (-0.80)  (2.79)  (1.66)  (0.36) 







  (-3.08)  (-2.06)  (-1.95)  (-3.20 ) 
EMP_TREAT_ 














 (10.80)  (13.59)  (12.42)  (13.53)  (13.59)  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15,520 15,520 11,292 11,292 9272 9272 11,063 11,063 11,292 11,292 
Adjusted R2 50.7% 34.7% 56.2% 94.5% 56.9% 81.7% 55.6% 94.0% 56.2% 56.2% 
First-stage Cragg  
and Donald Test p-value < 0.001  < 0.001   <0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  
Overidentification Test p-
value  0.866  0.959  0.116  0.908  0.693 
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This table presents the results from instrumental variable regressions that control for the the endogeneity of employee treatment. We employ two instruments: 
(1) the mean of the employee treatment score of firms having headquarters located in the same state (EMP_TREAT_STATE) and (2) the mean of the employee 
treatment score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code (EMP_TREAT_INDUSTRY). Section (1) presents the 2SLS estimation results for 
Model 2 of the study to test the relationship between employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE). Section (2) to Section (5) 
present the 2SLS estimation results for Model 3 of the study to test the impact of employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring 
(AB_NETHIRE) on various employee productivity and profitability measures (SALES, NETINCOME, GPROFIT and ROA). 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels. All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 
adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
 
